semi-trusted. Thus, massive techniques are proposed for ensuring the data security and decreasing the useless data such as semi-supervised learning, spammer detection framework and cryptographic protocol [1] [2] [3] [4] .
Generally, a cloud storage system should ensure availability (e.g., for any legitimate customer, (s)he can reach his/her uploaded data from some Internet-connected devices), reliability (of user data outsourced to the cloud), efficient retrieval (of user data outsourced to the cloud), data sharing (between authorized users), security (i.e., both confidentiality and integrity [5] ), and other features required/stated in the service level agreements (SLAs). Cryptographic schemes, such as proxy re-encryption, attributebased encryption, searchable encryption [6] [7] [8] [9] , have been designed to achieve several of these features.
Nowadays, most existing cryptographic schemes are number-theoretic-based [10] [11] [12] , which are not resilient against Shor's quantum attack algorithm [13, 14] using quantum computers. Code-based public key encryption (PKE) proposed by McEliece [15] in 1978 is widely considered to be post-quantum secure [16] . There are two key advantages in McEliece-like code-based PKE schemes, namely: encryption/decryption speed is very fast, and its security relies on hard problems in coding theory which is believed to resist quantum computing attacks. However, such schemes are not widely used in practice, partly due to large public key size (in comparison to classic number-theoretic-based schemes). Hence, how to design a code-based PKE scheme with small public key size is an area of active research. In 2017, for example, Loidreau proposed a code-based PKE scheme from rank metric [17] , which can significantly reduce the size of public keys compared to Hamming metric encryption schemes. More recently in 2018, Lau and Tan introduced a public key generation approach and a new rank metric code-based PKE scheme (hereafter refer to LT scheme) to further reduce the public key size [18] . The LT scheme was also shown to be indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) secure, based on the decisional rank syndrome decoding (DRSD) assumption.
Our contribution
For a PKE scheme, however, the strongest and the most popular security notion is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). This is the gap we seek to address in this paper. Our contribution in this paper include three aspects. Firstly, we propose a new IND-CCA2 secure PKE scheme based on the LT scheme. While the semantic security in our PKE scheme has been improved to be IND-CCA2 secure, the public key and ciphertext sizes remains small. Secondly, we give the formal proof of our PKE scheme under the DRSD assumption. Thirdly, we present a use case of our PKE scheme in secure cloud storage.
Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Prior to presenting our scheme, we introduce relevant background materials in "Preliminaries" section and the LT scheme [18] in "Revisiting the LT scheme" section. We then present our IND-CCA2 secure codebased PKE scheme in "Our IND-CCA2 secure PKE scheme" section, following by its security proof and performance evaluation in "Security proof " and "Efficiency" sections. For example, we show that the public key size in our new scheme is 15.06 KB under 141-bit security level which is acceptable in many today's applications. We use cloud storage as a use case and explain its potential utility in "A secure cloud storage use case" section. Finally, we conclude this paper in "Conclusion" section.
Preliminaries
In this section, we revisit the definitions, notations and materials relevant to rank metric codes, which is required in the understanding of our proposed scheme. In the rest of this paper, we will use the notations and the functions as we defined in Table 1 .
Definition 1 (Linear code and its generator matrix) An [n, k] q linear code C is a linear subspace of F n q with dimension k, and a matrix G ∈ F k×n q is called a generator matrix of C if its row vectors form a basic of C.
Definition 2 (Rank metric) Let F q m be an extension field of F q for some positive integer m, and β = (β 0 , β 1 , . . . , β m−1 ) a basis of F q m over F q . For each vector a = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ F n q m , we associate it with an m × n matrix
The rank of a , denoted by a , is defined as the rank of the matrix M(a) , and the rank distance between any two vectors x and y in F n q m is defined by �x − y�. 
Conv t (x)
A function that takes as input a vector x of length ⌊log q m n t ⌋ over F q m , and outputs an error vector of length n and weight t. The inverse of function
A function that takes as input a vector x , and outputs the left k components
A function that takes as input a vector x , and outputs the right k components Further, we use the notation Rot k (c) to denote a k × n matrix consisting of the first k rows of Rot(c). Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm for the DRSD problem. With respect to a security parameter , we define the advantage of A as In [19] , the DRSD problem is proven to be NP hard in the worst case; thus, it is reasonable to assume that Adv 
Definition 4 (Decisional

Revisiting the LT scheme [18]
The LT scheme [18] consists of four PPT algorithms, namely: Setup, KGen, Enc, and Dec which are described as follows.
• Setup(1 ): Given a security parameter , the algorithm chooses a prime power q, a group of integers (n, m, k, k 0 ,
. The algorithm then outputs the public parameter params = (q, n, m, k, k 0 , k 1 , t).
• KGen(params): Give the public parameter params, the algorithm The public/private key pair is ( pk = (Ĝ, x), sk = (Q, G, P, DEC(·))).
The algorithms Enc and Dec are listed in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively.
As mentioned previously, the LT scheme was proven to be IND-CPA secure under the DRSD assumption in [18] .
Our IND-CCA2 secure PKE scheme
In this section, we convert the LT scheme into an IND-CCA2 secure PKE scheme in which two error vectors come from a random value. This allows the new scheme to avoid the expansion of ciphertext.
Our new IND-CCA2 secure PKE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
• Setup(1 ): Given a security parameter , the algorithm
• Chooses a prime number power q, a group of integers (n, m, k, k 0 ,
• Chooses a random vector con over F q m with Len(con) ≤ 1 2 ℓ , where ℓ 0 = ⌊log q m n t 0 ⌋ , ℓ 1 = ⌊log q m n t 1 ⌋ , and ℓ = ℓ 0 + ℓ 1 ;
• Outputs the public parameter params = (q, n, m, k, k 0 , k 1 , t, t 0 , t 1 , con).
• KGen(params): Give the public parameter params = (q, n, m, k, k 0 , k 1 , t, t 0 , t 1 , con) , the algorithm 
Fig. 1 Encryption algorithm in LT scheme
Dec(sk, c): The public key is pk = (Ĝ, x) and the private key is sk = (Q, G, P, DEC(·)).
Similar to in "Revisiting the LT scheme" section, we list the algorithms Enc and Dec of our proposed PKE scheme in Figs. 3 and 4 , respectively.
Security proof
In this section, we prove the correctness and IND-CCA2 security of our code-based PKE scheme presented in the preceding section. (n − k) holds. If not, returns to STEP 6. STEP 8: c 1 = (m r |u 4 )Ĝ + e 1 ; STEP 9: Outputs c = (c 0 , c 1 ).
Fig. 3 Encryption algorithm in our scheme
Dec(sk, c):
Outputs m if con = con and ⊥ otherwise.
Fig. 4 Decryption algorithm in our scheme
Correctness
According to the Enc and Dec algorithms of our scheme, we can easily get:
Then, we can compute the error vectors e 0 and e 1 correctly with the vector u 4 
This concludes the correctness proof of our scheme.
IND-CCA2 security
The IND-CCA2 security for any PKE scheme can be defined as follows.
Definition 6 (IND-CCA2 security)
For any two-stage (find stage and guess stage) adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against a PKE scheme E = (Setup, KGen, Enc, Dec) , the IND-CCA2 security is modeled as an experiment Exp
IND-CCA2
A,PKE ( ) with respect to a security parameter .
Exp
IND-CCA2
A,PKE 
A,PKE ( ) is negligible with respect to . In addition, the above experiment can become an IND-CPA experiment if A is not allowed to make decryption query. We denote by Exp
IND-CPA
A,PKE ( ) the IND-CPA experiment and the advantage of A is defined by
(1) Adv
We divide the security proof of our scheme into two phases following the approach in [20] . First, we give the IND-CPA security proof based on the IND-CPA security of the LT scheme. Then, we prove the IND-CCA2 security of our scheme in the random oracle model. Proof We assume that C is a challenger, who is responsible for the generation of the public parameters params and a public-private key pair (pk, sk) by running the algorithms Setup and KGen , respectively. It is obvious that A should have the advantage Adv (m b |con) . Otherwise, C outputs a random vector. If A makes queries to H on a vector u ′ 1 , C first checks whether u ′ 1 = u 1 . If yes, C outputs H(u 1 ) = u 2 − v. Otherwise, C outputs a random vector. It is obvious that C can not simulate the Rd correctly if C doesn't know u 1 . Hence, C could simulate Rd and H correctly if and only if A made queries to H on u 1 first and then to Rd on v . We define two events Evt 1 and Evt 2 as follows:
Theorem 1 Assume that
• Evt 1 : the event that v is queried to Rd in q Rd queries before u 1 is queried to H.
• Evt 2 : the event that u 1 is queried to H in q H times before v is queried to Rd. (4)
It is obvious that the probability
According to Eq. (2), we have and i.e.,
As we know, b and v are generated randomly by C , so A could not obtain any information about them if the event Evt 1 ∨ Evt 2 did not happen. For instead, C can recover u 4 from c if the event Evt 2 happens. In the other words, while event Evt 2 ∧ ¬Evt 1 happens, C could use A to break the LT scheme. Thus, we have
On the other hand, the probability that v is exactly queried to Rd is 1 q mr . Hence, the probability that Evt 1 happens during the q Rd queries on Rd is According to Eqs. (3), (5), (6), (7) we can get:
That is, we have
Theorem 2 Assume that A is an attacker in the experiment Exp
IND-CCA2
Pr[Exp
IND-CPA A,PKE ( ) = 1] = Adv IND-CPA A,PKE ( ) + 1 2 Adv IND-CPA A,PKE ( ) + 1 2 ≤ 1 + Pr[Evt 1 ∨ Evt 2 ] 2 , (5) Adv IND-CPA A,PKE ( ) ≤ Pr[Evt 1 ∨ Evt 2 ]. (6) Pr[Evt 2 ∧ ¬Evt 1 ] = ε. (7) Pr[Evt 1 ] ≤ 1 − 1 − 1 q mr q Rd ≤ q Rd q mr . ε = Pr[Evt 2 ∧ ¬Evt 1 ] = Pr[Evt 2 ] = Pr[Evt 2 ∨ Evt 1 ] − Pr[Evt 1 ] ≥ Adv IND-CPA A,PKE ( ) − q Rd q mr . Adv IND-CPA A,PKE ( ) ≤ ε + q Rd q mr .
Adv
IND-CCA2
A,PKE
Proof We assume that C is a challenger, who is responsible for the generation of the public parameters params and a public-private key pair (pk, sk) by running the algorithms Setup and KGen , respectively. It is clear that A should have the advantage Adv
A,PKE ( ) against our scheme if C simulates oracles H , Rd and the decryption oracle D correctly. C simulates H and Rd in the same way of the proof of Theorem 1. Then, C uses the plaintextextractor described in [21] to construct the decryption oracle via the following steps.
• The plaintext-extractor takes as input a ciphertext c.
• For q Rd times queries to Rd, the input and the output pairs of Rd are denoted by (v i , V i ) , 1 ≤ i ≤ q Rd . Similarly, the input and the output pairs of H are denoted by (u 1j ,
are two error vectors of c and Rt k (u 1j |u 2 ) is the plaintext of c in the LT scheme.
• If the plaintext-extractor cannot find the pair (v i , V i ) or (u 1j , U 1j ) , it rejects the ciphertext c.
Based on the above construction, we know that the plaintext-extractor cannot simulate D unless A made queries u 1j to H and v i to Rd before the ciphertext c is queried to D . It should be noted that in this case we have Eqs. (8) and (9) . For further analysis, we define a new event, denoted by Evt 3 , as
• Evt 3 : the event that A queries the appropriate ciphertext c to D before A queries u 1j to H and v i to Rd.
It is obvious that the probability that the appropriate ciphertext c is queried to D is 1 q 2mn . Hence, we get the probability that the event Evt 3 occurs in at most q D queries satisfies As in the proof of Theorem 1, C could simulate these oracles correctly while the event Evt 2 (equivalent to event Evt 2 ∧ ¬Evt 3 ∧ ¬Evt 1 ) happened. Then, we have (8) 
That is, we have Adv
Efficiency
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of our proposed PKE scheme by comparing with two recently proposed schemes (i.e., Wang's scheme [22] and Loidreau's scheme [17] ), in terms of public key and ciphertext sizes. It should be noted that both Loidreau's scheme and our proposed scheme are based on rank metric codes, while Wang's scheme is based on Hamming metric codes. For a better understanding of our strengths, we introduce a family of the most representative rank metric codes called Gabidulin codes first.
Definition 7 (Gabidulin codes)
For an element a ∈ F q m and an integer i ∈ Z , we denote a [i] = a q i . Further for a vector a = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ F n q m , we denote 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ F n q m is defined with the following k by n generator matrix:
According to the analysis in [18, [23] [24] [25] , a secure code-based PKE scheme should be able to resist several structural attacks, such as key recovery attack, reduction attack and moore decomposition attack [23] . In particular, we can obtain the lower bound of the computation costs that an adversary needs to break a PKE scheme based on Gabidulin codes. The lower bound, known as the PQ-security level [17, 26] , can be computed by the following formula:
where t is the correction ability of the underlying Gabidulin codes.
As the same in the LT scheme [18] , we choose two sets of parameters params 1 = (q = 2, m = 75, n = 73, k = 21, t 0 = t 1 = 13) and params 2 = (q = 2, m = 85, n = 83, k = 18, t 0 = t 1 = 16) , which can achieve the security levels
⌋ and 2 154 ≈ 85 3 · 2
⌋ , respectively, according to Eq. (11) . Recall that the ciphertext in our scheme is of the form c = (c 0 , c 1 ) , where c 0 and c 1 are two vectors of the same length n over F q m . For the first parameter set params 1 , we have the ciphertext size of 2 · 73 · 75 bits = 10950 bits ≈ 1.37 KB . Similarly, we can get the ciphertext size of 2 · 83 · 85 bits = 14110 bits ≈ 1.76 KB for the second parameter set params 2 .
As to the public key, it has the form of pk = (Ĝ, x) in our scheme, where Ĝ is a k × n matrix over F q m and x is a vector of the length n over F q m . For the first parameter set params 1 , we have the public key size of 75 · (21 + 1) · 73 bits = 120450 bits ≈ 15.06 KB . Similarly, we can get the public key
size of 85 · (18 + 1) · 83 bits = 134045 bits ≈ 16.76 KB for the second parameter set param 2 . We note that the ciphertext and public key sizes of our IND-CCA2 secure scheme are exactly the same to the ones of the IND-CPA secure LT scheme. Compared to Loidreau's scheme [17] , which is a recently proposed PKE scheme based on rank metric codes, our PKE scheme has a significant advantage in terms of public key size and ciphertext size (see Table 2 ).
For a fair comparison between our rank metric codes-based PKE scheme and Wang's scheme from Hamming metric codes [22] , we choose two new sets of parameters params 3 = (q = 2, m = 71, n = 69, k = 19, t 0 = t 1 = 13) and params 4 = (q = 2, m = 101, n = 99, k = 22, t 0 = t 1 = 17) , which can achieve the security levels 71 3 · 2 Table 2 , we observe that our code-based PKE scheme also has a significant advantage to Wang's scheme in terms of public key size.
A secure cloud storage use case
In this section, we explain how our proposed code-based PKE scheme can be deployed in a cloud storage system. We use the notations CBEnc(·)/CBDec(·) and SEnc(·)/SDec(·) to denote the encryption/decryption algorithms in our proposed code-based PKE scheme and a secure symmetric encryption scheme, respectively. In our cloud storage system, we assume that there are two users (Alice and Bob) and multiple storage servers. Alice splits her data into some data blocks and sends each block to storage servers (one data block can be sent to several storage severs). Bob can get the data blocks from the cloud and recover them into the original data (see Fig. 5 ).
If Alice wants to store data M in the cloud and shares it with Bob, she can select a random session key K for the symmetric encryption algorithm and encrypts it under Bob's public key pk B to get a ciphertext EK = CBEnc(pk B , K ) . Then, Alice can split the data M into m blocks M = M 1 �M 2 � · · · �M m and uses K to encrypt them to get 
as the header data (see Fig. 6 ). Finally, she sends the header data and ciphertext C i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m , to m storage servers. If Alice wants to check the data integrity of some ciphertext block C i , she can ask the corresponding storage server to compute Hash(C i ) and send it back to her. If the received Hash(C i ) matches her local hash value for C i , she is assured that the data are intact and have not modified by the cloud storage server. On the other hand, if Bob wants to get the data M from Alice via the cloud storage system, he can find the corresponding m ciphertext data blocks C i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m , and their header data (ID A , EK , EH i ) by searching for ID A in the cloud. Then, Bob can download them and runs CBDec(sk B , EK ) to recover the symmetric key K with his private key sk B . Next, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m , Bob uses the obtained symmetric key K to decrypt EH i and C i to get Hash(C i ) and M i , respectively. To verify the data integrity of M i , Bob computes Hash(C i ) and checks whether it is equal to h i obtained from EH i . If yes, it means that C i has not been modified by the storage server and the corresponding M i is the original data from Alice. Otherwise, Bob asks the corresponding SS i of the non-matching C i to send the data again.
From the above description, we find that the security of the proposed cloud storage system relies mainly on the security of our code-based PKE scheme and the symmetric encryption scheme. As mentioned in "Introduction" section, our scheme is able to resist quantum computer-facilitated attacks and achieves IND-CCA2 security as demonstrated in "Security proof " section. Clearly, Alice can access her data stored in the cloud using any devices by searching for the data with her ID. Moreover, both Alice and Bob can check the integrity of the downloaded data from the cloud. In the event that the data were modified by the cloud storage server or during the communication, Bob can detect this and then proceed to download the corresponding blocks again. Thus, the proposed cloud storage system provides availability, reliability, efficient retrieval and data sharing, even in the post-quantum era.
Conclusion
Code-based public key cryptography (PKC) can potentially be deployed in real-world applications to ensure quantum computing attack resilience. Existing code-based PKC schemes are broadly categorized into those based on Hamming metric codes and those based on rank metric codes, and it is believed that the latter generally has smaller public key and ciphertext sizes than the former under the same security level.
In this paper, we presented a new rank metric codes-based public key encryption scheme from Lau and Tan's scheme [18] , and hence inherits the latter's small public key and ciphertext size properties. However, our new scheme achieves IND-CCA2 secure (the highest security assurance possible), as shown in this paper. We also analyzed its efficiency in term of the public key size and the ciphertext size. Finally, we presented a use case to demonstrate its utility in practice.
Future work includes constructing more rank metric codes-based cryptographic primitives, such as proxy re-encryption and attribute-based encryption, to achieve other desirable properties in practical applications. We also intend to implement and evaluate a prototype of the proposed/extended scheme in collaboration with a (small) cloud storage service provider.
